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Abstract
The question in which we are interested is how a market inhabited by multiple
agents, about whom we are differentially uncertain, and who trade goods the use of
which imposes a negative effect on others, is to be ideally regulated. We show that a
priori asymmetric uncertainty, when combined with a posteriori observed outcomes,
is a rich source of information that can be used to reduce aggregate uncertainty. The
observation implies that whereas asymmetric information usually entails a cost on
welfare, it can help achieve greater efficiency in regulation.
JEL codes: D82, D83, H23
Keywords: asymmetric information, regulatory instruments, policy updating, asym-
metric uncertainty, decision making under uncertainty
1 Introduction
One evening in a small bar, a male and a female sit by a table, smoking one cigarette after
another. At the end of a long evening, the bar is black with smoke. As the couple leaves
the establishment, some remaining customers voice their frustrations to the bartender.
“We did not come here,” they say, “to drink our beers in the smoke of others. Please, for the
sake of us all and the common good, next time do intervene.” These complainants being
regulars, the bartender takes their discontent seriously. Counting the butts in the ashtray,
*Heijmans (r.j.r.k.heijmans@uvt.nl) and Gerlagh (r.gerlagh@uvt.nl) are at the Economics Department
of Tilburg University.
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he concludes the couple smoked 20 cigarettes that evening. As it happens, the female has
frequented this bar for years. The bartender knows she always smokes 10 cigarettes on a
night out. This leads to the conclusion that the male, who is new in town, has smoked 10
cigarettes as well. After elaborate calculations – into which we shall not dwell any further
here – on the back of a coaster, the tapster decides an outcome where half this number of
cigarettes, i.e. 10, is smoked is, in expectations, economically efficient for the full clientèle.
Next Tuesday, the same people visit the bar, and the barkeeper politely asks the couple
to set a ceiling to their habit. “You can smoke five cigarettes each,” they are told, “though
you can freely trade these right between the two of you, as long as the total does not
exceed ten.” That evening, the bartender notices something quite peculiar. As the couple
spends a cozy evening, the female smokes nine cigarettes, while the male consumes only
one. What should the bartender to? He concludes the male must somehow have less of an
appetite for smoking than initially thought. Following basic economic reasoning and in
search of an outcome that is in the best overall interest, one week later the couple is asked
to decrease their common budget further from ten to six cigarettes.
At a certain level of conceptual abstraction, the barkeeper’s situation is similar to
a signal extraction problem, which as a branch of statistical theory goes by the name
of filtering. Practitioners of the economic profession have applied these methods – and
most frequently the Kalman filter (which we know to be the optimal filter when signals
are normally distributed) – in many corners of their discipline; from the navigation of
the Apollo project, to investment decisions (Townsend, 1983) and macroeconomic theory
(Lucas, 1978), finance (Makarov and Rytchkov, 2012), time series econometrics (Hamilton,
1989; Baxter and King, 1999; Harvey and Trimbur, 2003; Talmon and Coifman, 2013) and
behavioral economics (Mullainathan, 2002; Moore and Healy, 2008). Our mission will be
to apply the insights so fruitfully used in all said applications and further develop these
for the field of regulation.
The classical argument to favor markets is of remarkably individualistic nature. Any
distribution of production or consumption that comes about through free exchanges in
well-functioning market environments, so it goes, will always be at least as efficient as
had allocations been set to individual agents directly. This is why many economists favor
market-wide constraints over individual-specific ones. We do not doubt the rightness of
this conviction, yet we do point out it is in a sense incomplete. Though markets help the
efficiency of the individual distribution of some undertaken activity, they do not resolve
the problem of joint efficiency at the aggregate.
Our central thesis builds on the logic presented above: when left to free exchanges the
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agents in a market will trade and barter until no further mutually beneficial deals can be
made, ensuring an efficient allocation of, say, cigarettes across individual agents. However,
there is more to be inferred – about the aggregate efficiency – and the logic is simple.
Suppose we observe some final distribution of cigarettes comes about and suppose also that
this distribution is different from the most likely outcome we had initially assumed would
occur. We realize that our initial estimation of smokers’ preferences need some correction.
This is nothing new, some would argue, for this possibility is the very reason a market was
established in the first place. However, rather than applaud ourselves for having achieved
greater welfare by establishing a market, we admit that these wrong initial estimates may
fairly well imply the aggregate number of cigarettes allowed to the market was, in fact,
wrong, and a better estimate can be constructed on the basis of market evidence.
Consider the example with which we started. Suppose we know the preferences of
smoker 1 while those of smoker 2 are uncertain but we initially expect them to be the same
as for smoker 1. We allocate a total of ten cigarettes to the market, which is optimal given
our initial estimate of preferences. This estimate also tells us that in fact each smoker
will consume five cigarettes. Upon seeing that in reality smoker 1 smokes nine cigarettes
while smoker 1 consumes only one, we realized our estimate of smoker 2’s preferences was
wrong, because he or she is in fact a less devout consumer of the tobacco. Given we know
the preferences of smoker 1, and given we now learned those of smoker 2 are stronger, we
conclude ‘aggregate’ preferences for smoking are lower than expected. Standard economics
then dictates that a lower aggregate cigarette consumption would consequently be socially
optimal. Instead of 10, the bar tender gives them 6 cigarettes to smoke jointly.
In practical terms we are saying that the market cap on some activity with an associated
externality should be endogenous to market behavior as the latter represents information
regarding relevant characteristics of the market we are regulating and about which we
are uncertain. If our exercise is to not only make the cap endogenous but in fact make it
optimally so, we introduce a technical challenge. The standard problem, meaning with
a fixed cap, imposes total consumption of cigarettes as exogenously given and lets the
market sort out the individual allocations, subject to a simple constraint: total smoking is
not to exceed the cap. With an endogenous cap on the other hand, individual smokers still
trade freely, but these trades have an effect on how much can be freely traded in the first
place, meaning the cap is a function of trades. Our question is simple but fundamental:
what would be the properties of a more efficient cap? Turning the question around, we can
ask: which of the properties of trading with an exogenous cap are (clearly) suboptimal.
One prominent candidate is the use of information. An optimal exogenously fixed cap is
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efficient in expectations, before any observation on individual outcomes is available.
We propose to make use of more refined information, namely not aggregate but
individual behavior. This information is readily available, as is the information on aggregate
behavior, yet it provides a rich source for information about aggregate preferences that
can greatly improve efficiency of regulation. The intuition we presented earlier in this
introduction. What we want to emphasize is that we particularly exploit asymmetries in
uncertainty. If the bar tender had exactly the same prior information about the female
and male, he could update the estimates for individual preferences, but not for aggregate
preferences. The aggregate revision requires asymmetry in priors.
Our approach has a flavor of mechanism design, but we regulate a market only in the
aggregate, and thus we search for information about aggregate preferences. The approach
followed by mechanism designers is to offer menus or contracts to each individual agent,
searching for information on individual preferences with no mechanism for the aggregate
regulation level.
A careful reading of the smoking example reveals another property of our regulatory
policy: we focus on quantities only. It is well known at least since Roberts and Spence
(1976) that a combination of instruments, such as a hybrid between prices and quantities,
can in principle do better than one of these instruments alone. Say, the bar tender could
have offered extra quota for some price. Again, we abstract away from such combinations
of different instruments and instead focus on pure instruments and take this type of
regulation as far as it can get. What we will see is that, when used smartly, welfare losses
can be substantially mitigated compared to pure trading policies, motivating the idea that
no need exists for complicated hybrid instruments if one is willing to carefully contemplate
on and improve the pure instruments.
2 Model
Our universe is a bar, inhabited by two atomic or price-taking smokers and a handful of
other clients.1 To every smoker i, smoking s̃i cigarettes yields private benefits Bi(s̃i; θi).
The parameter θi can be thought of as a preference shifter, affecting how much pleasure
is derived from smoking a given number of cigarettes and is known to smoker i but not
to any other individual. Although the actual realization of θi is private information, it is
1A price-taking duo may sound a wee bit unrealistic to many economists. One possible interpretation
is that our environment is not a bar, but instead a large-scale disco in New York City where smoking is
allowed but regulated, and where we assume there are two large groups of smokers. In this case, every
individual smoker only has a negligible effect on the eventual price of cigarettes.
4
Heijmans and Gerlagh, 2018 Regulating Global Externalities
common knowledge that E[θi] = 0, E[θ2i ] = σ2i , and E[θ1θ2] = ρσ1σ2. Because this universe
is uncertain to the extent that θi cannot be properly predicted, σ
2
i is a logical measure for
the uncertainty about a agent i’s preferences. To say that uncertainty is asymmetric in
our terminology is equivalent to saying that σ1 6= σ2.
As far as smoking emits smoke, it is disliked by the other customers. We will assume
that the severity of this externality depends on the total amount of smoke in the bar
only, independent of which smoker exhaled it, so we are dealing with a global externality.
Because there is (in this simplified universe) a one-to-one relationship between the amount
of cigarettes consumed and the amount of smoke produced, we can treat the externality
as a cost, broadly interpreted, C(s̃1 + s̃2) depending solely on the aggregate number of
cigarettes smoked.
As the other clients are bothered by the amount of smoke emitted, the barkeeper faces
the task of finding quantities s̃1 and s̃2 that maximize social welfare:
W = B1(s̃1; θ1) +B2(s̃2; θ2)− C(s̃1 + s̃2). (1)
In the absence of asymmetric information, the fully knowledgeable barkeeper can set these
quantities directly or else put a price on cigarettes that will make the individual smokers
consume the same quantities, and these two instruments are perfectly equivalent, see
Montgomery (1972). As was first shown by Weitzman (1974), this formal equivalence
between instruments breaks down once we introduce an informational disparity, captured
here by θi.
It will serve the analysis to make some restrictive assumptions regarding the forms
benefits and costs take. In particular, we shall consider both to be of the linear-quadratic
form. Thus, benefits to smoker i are given by:
Bi(s̃i; θi) = (p
∗
i + θi)(s̃i − s∗i )−
βi
2
(s̃i − s∗i )2, (2)
where the vector (p∗i , s
∗
i ) is common knowledge and will be elaborated upon soon. Marginal
benefits are therefore linear in cigarettes with the intercept determined by θi:
MBi(s̃i) = p
∗
i − βi(s̃i − s∗i ) + θi. (3)
Costs as a result of disutlity from smoke are described by the functional form:
C(s̃1 + s̃2) = p
∗(s̃1 + s̃2 − s∗1 − s∗2) +
γ
2
(s̃1 + s̃2 − s∗1 − s∗2)2. (4)
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Marginal costs due to smoke are then seen to be:
MC(s̃1 + s̃2) = p
∗ + γ(s̃1 + s̃2 − s∗1 − s∗2). (5)
For brevity of notation, where convenient we may write S̃ = s̃1 + s̃2 and S
∗ = s∗1 + s
∗
2. Our





∗) describing the slopes and intercepts of
three linear curves. We need only two per curve, that is six in total. Consequently, we
may take the freedom to reduce the number of parameters by defining p∗ = p∗1 = p
∗
2, with
the convenient implication that (p∗, s∗1, s
∗
2) is the vector of welfare-maximizing prices and
cigarettes for smoker i given preferences turn out as expected (θ1 = θ2 = 0). We label this
the ex-ante optimum. It is easily seen that global marginal costs and regional marginal
benefits equal p∗. This is clearly not an assumption, nor even a normalization; it is a
definition. Entailing no more than a simplification of otherwise potentially cumbersome
notation, we introduce it here for our own convenience without any implicated loss of
generality.
Before proceeding to the analysis, we introduce some further notation. Superscripts
will be scenario labels for equilibrium outcomes. Moreover, let x̃k denote the value of a
variable x under policy k, then let xk := x̃k − x∗ be the deviation of x under policy k
from the ex-ante expected optimal value x∗, and let ∆kx := x̃k− xSO denote the difference
between the value of x under scenario k and its ex post socially optimal value (to be
derived shortly).
The game has the following stages:
1. The barkeeper chooses an instrument to regulate the market for cigarettes.
2. Both smokers observe their individual preference shock θ1 and θ2.
3. Trade clears the market. Prices and quantities are chosen, jointly for both smokers,
consistent with utility maximization by each smoker,
−βiski + θi = pki , (6)
while the policy rules determine the relation between quantities and prices within
and across smokers.
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2.1 Symmetric Information and Perfect Foresight
By standard arguments, it is immediately clear that marginal benefits of smoking should
equal the marginal costs of smoke in an efficient outcome which implies MB1 = MB2. Since








2 ) = p
SO,
so that the Social Optimum is easily characterized:
pSO =
γ(β2θ1 + β1θ2)
γβ1 + γβ2 + β1β2
, (7)
sSOi =
β−iθi + γ(θi − θ−i)




γβ1 + γβ2 + β1β2
, (9)
where i ∈ {1, 2} and −i is the complement. Thus, a positive preference shift induces
increased consumption of cigarettes by the smoker to whom it occurred, and decreases it
for the other, though aggregate consumption and the common price always increase for a
positive shift to either smoker.
2.2 Implementing the Social Optimum: First-best Equilibrium
A straightforward mechanism that implements the Social Optimum is a simple ascending
clock auction. In its most basic form, the barkeeper offers a supply curve, in price-cigarette
space, that coincides with the marginal cost curve. This way, utility-maximizing smokers
necessarily incorporate the externality caused by their smoke into smoking behavior,
guaranteeing implementation of the Social Optimum as a first-best equilibrium.
That such an easy way of implementing the Social Optimum exists is reason for
optimism. After all, it implies that the Social Optimum can be reached without great effort
or complication. Nonetheless, practice suggests that such instruments as the ascending
clock auction are not feasible for reasons outside the scope of our model. The barkeeper
is in such a case constrained to other instruments, accepting a second-best regulated
equilibrium as at least superior to no regulation at all. It is that context that we are
about to define and analyze. Before doing so, however, we will first derive in general terms
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the aggregate welfare loss under a given policy relative to the first-best, Social Optimum
welfare level.
2.3 Welfare Costs of Policies
By definition of the difference under policy k with the social optimum and considering a
smoker’s equilibrium behavior (6), it is immediate that smoking deviations from the Social
Optimum scale with price deviations:
∆kpi = −βi∆ksi. (10)























Given realized preferences, individual prices and cigarette consumption map injectively.
Policies featuring equal prices across smokers thus admit the property that individual
and aggregate consumption scale with the common price. Consequently, for such policies















The simplest possible policy simply sets quotas for each smoker individually:
Definition 1 (Quotas). To both smokers individually, the barkeeper allocates the ex-ante
optimal amount of cigarettes s∗i :
s1 = s2 = 0, (13)
while prices adjust to reach equilibrium on the market for cigarettes (6).
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1 + (γ + β1)σ
2
2 − 2γρσ1σ2
γβ1 + γβ2 + β1β2
. (14)
For future reference, it is important to note that Quantities under autarky as regulation
can be considered the execution of the welfare program
max
s1,s2
E W (s1, s2; θ1, θ2) (15)
That is, Quantities is the optimal choice under the information constraint that both
quantities must be set before any information is revealed, and without the use of any
information extracted from markets. It admits the desirable property that expected
marginal benefits equals marginal costs:
E[MBi|si] = MC (16)
where we note that the RHS marginal costs are perfectly known, when quantities are set
whereas the prices at the LHS are stochastic variables due unknown preferences θi.
3.2 Taxes
Another possibility is to impose a price or tax on cigarettes:
Definition 2 (Taxes). The regulator cigarette-taxes at the ex-ante optimal level p̃1 =
p̃2 = p
∗:
p1 = p2 = 0. (17)
Cigarette consumption adjust to reach equilibrium on market for cigarettes (6).
Smokers consume cigarettes conditional on preference θi according to ∆
P si = θi/βi.















γβ1 + γβ2 + β1β2
. (18)
Taxes as a policy can be considered the execution of the welfare program
max
p1,p2
E [W (s1, s2; θ1, θ2)] (19)
s.t. − βiski + θi = pki (6)
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That is, Taxes are the optimal choice under the informational constraint that cigarette-
prices for both smokers must be set before any information is revealed. It has the desirable
property that marginal benefits equals expected marginal costs:
MB1 = MB2 = E[MC|p] (20)
where we note that the LHS are marginal benefits which are known with certainty when
Taxes are set.
4 The Market For Cigarettes
The barkeeper may well understand that through establishing a market for cigarettes even
better outcomes, in terms of social welfare, can be obtained. The basic idea is very simple
and familiar to every economist in the modern tradition: when a market for cigarettes
exists, smokers can freely exchange their smokes, and since such exchanges will only take
place as long as they are mutually beneficial, aggregate welfare will be larger as compared
to a scenario where no market exists. The policy where a market with the essential feature
of free exchange is created will be called Trading.
4.1 Trade
Definition 3 (Trading). The barkeeper allocates the ex-ante optimal number of cigarettes
s∗i to both smokers. smokers can freely exchange cigarettes, subject to:
s1 + s2 = 0. (21)
Equilibrium on the market for cigarettes implies (6). Optimization and free trading
ensures cigarettes are exchanged until marginal benefits are equal for both smokers:
p1 = p2. (22)
Trading allows smokers the flexibility to efficiently redistribute cigarette allocations in













γβ1 + γβ2 + β1β2
. (23)
The following proposition is now immediate:
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Proposition 1. Trading always outperforms Quotas in terms of welfare.
Proof. In Appendix. Q.E.D.
It is quite trivial that Trading improves welfare compared to autarkic Quotas. Under
the former, aggregate smoking, and therefore costs, are fixed. Yet through a process of
mutually beneficial exchanges, benefits including revenues from cigarette sales, increase
for both smokers, raising welfare overall.
The conceptual quality of trade as regulatory principle can be seen more clearly when
taking a more principal look at the policy and its rules. Quotas under autarky as policy
can be considered the implementation of welfare program (15). Trading, on the other







W (s1, s2; θ1, θ2)
]
(24)
s.t. s1 + s2 = G (25)
That is, Trading effectively delays the choice for optimal smoking per smoker until the
point information is revealed. It admits the desirable property that not only do marginal
costs equal expected marginal benefits (which is true also for Quotas, see (16)) – realized
marginal benefits are also equal for both smokers:
MB = MB1 = MB2 (26)
E[MB|s1 + s2] = MC (27)
One might wonder about price volatility in the market for cigarettes. After all, if
welfare under Trading is higher than under Quotas, as Proposition 1 establishes, and
if we know from condition (22) that prices will be equal for both smokers, given also it
is known that in markets with constant prices welfare losses scale with price deviations
(equation (12)), then should it not follow price volatility is lower under Trading than
under Quotas? The proposition maintained a purposeful silence about aggregate price
volatility in the Trading market. It did so because results are mixed. One might at
first suspect trade to reduce global volatility compared to autarkic Quotas, but a simple
thought experiment is illustrative for the wrongness of this intuition. For that, we note
first that prices in equilibrium equate marginal benefits, so that the volatility of prices
is also equal, in equilibrium, to the volatility of marginal benefits. Consider then two
smokers, the second with more uncertain preferences than the first, σ2  σ1, as well as a
larger absorptive capacity, β2  β1. Consequently, if under Quotas, say, five cigarettes
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are allocated to both of them, we expect price volatility to be almost zero for smoker
1 but much larger for smoker 2, for only the latter experiences large ‘preference shifts’.
When we introduce Trading, the globally efficient allocation of cigarettes may be such
that many flow to smoker 2, inducing a much stronger price fluctuation for smoker 1 than
under Quotas. This means that the first smoker has practically imported part of the
price volatility from the second. As the first is characterized by little absorption, prices in
equilibrium under Trading will mainly be driven by the second smoker. Aggregate price
volatility has in fact increased.
This point is neither just a footnote nor a mere theoretical curiosity. For the success of
a Trading regime, it is of fundamental importance. After all, would a stable smoker be
willing to expose itself directly to the risk of its unstable trading partners? It appears, to
say the least, unlikely. There is no trivial solution to this fundamental problem. Yet we
are about to show how it can be substantially mitigated.
4.2 Rates of substitution
True as it may be that Trading is good for welfare, we argue that it is not best, and
therefore the barkeeper can do better. In fact, we will shortly show that the regulator is
able to do so rather easily, although some delicate insights must be developed first, for
else one may not fully understand the subtle mechanisms at work.
The primary notion we need to establish is that exist not a single marginal rate of
substitution for permits; rather, there are two. One operates at the individual smoker’s
level, the other on the aggregate or global level.
The individual rate, labeled MRSi, appears to be the rate one most frequently has in
mind when speaking loosely of marginal substitution, it being the rate at which cigarettes
can change hands between individual smokers. Although it might seem intuitive that
manipulating this trading ratio’ could improve welfare, it can in fact be shown that letting
it deviate from unity is never optimal. This follows from first principles. An efficient
allocation of cigarettes equates marginal benefits across smokers. Smokers, however, only
have an incentive to perfectly equate marginal benefits (or the value of smoking) when
cigarettes can be traded one-to-one, that is, when one cigarette lost by a smoker translates
into exactly one cigarette gained by the other. Therefore, only if the MRSi is unity will
smokers have no incentive to trade cigarettes other than the full equalization of marginal
benefits.
These observations do not imply, as might come across at first, that the barkeeper’s
arsenal of instruments is left depleted. Individual trades must be left untouched, it is
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true, but aggregate trades can still be manipulated. Indeed, one cannot seriously think
of any proper economic reasoning contra such operations. It combines the best of two
worlds: individual smokers consider their impact on aggregate trade flows to be negligible
and will therefore trade freely on the basis of one-to-one exchanges, steering cigarette
consumption toward a perfect equalization of marginal benefits, while at the global level
smoking is nonetheless adapted to correct for the possibly flawed and suboptimal initial
endowment of cigarettes revealed by the market through its self-chosen trade flows. In
it simplest form, this manipulation of aggregate permit trades operates through a fixed
ratio, called the aggregate marginal rate of substitution, MRSa for short. To find a handle
on the aggregate rate of substitution, we will formulate regulation as the solution to a
welfare-maximization problem. We then replicate Trading as regulation, and find a natural
generalization, which we label Stabilized Trading. That approach will inform us how to
model such aggregate manipulations, deriving how these should occur in an optimal bar.
4.3 Stabilized Trading
Definition 4 (Stabilized Trading). The barkeeper adapts the aggregate allocation of
cigarettes based on observed trade for fixed MRSA = δ:
δs1 + s2 = 0. (28)
Profit maximization and free trading with MRSi = 1 ensures that smokers allocate
cigarettes so that marginal productivity is equal for both of them:
p2 = p1. (29)
We observe that for δ = 1, Stabilized Trading is one-to-one also at the aggregate level
and thus equivalent to traditional Trading. This observation immediately suggests that
Stabilized Trading always outperforms traditional Trading, since the barkeeper is free to
choose a stabilization rate δ equal to unity but not imposed to do so, which added freedom
cannot deteriorate global welfare. We can derive the following result:




2 − ρσ1σ2] + γ[σ21 + σ22 − 2ρσ1σ2]
β2[σ21 − ρσ1σ2] + γ[σ21 + σ22 − 2ρσ1σ2]
, (30)
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Stabilized Trade equaling Trade is a measure-zero event. In particular,






Before we turn our attention to the particular properties of the stabilization rate, we
want to appreciate its principles more fundamentally at the informational level. If we
generally consider instruments from the class of Quantity-based ones, we understand these
can be interpreted as allowing, in principle, full observation of each smoker’s cigarette
consumption and setting restrictions to these. Thus, what we aim for as the most efficient
quantity-based instrument is an equalization of marginal benefits and marginal costs, after
observing all quantities (cf (27))!
E[MB|s1, s2] = MC (32)
Note that upon observing both quantities, the difference in preference shifts can be
constructed:
µ ≡ θ2 − θ1 = β1s1 − β2s2 (33)
Using the demand equation and plugging in µ, we find























The RHS is straightforwardly equated to marginal damages:











which for convenience we rewrite as
δs1 + s2 = 0, (28)
14
Heijmans and Gerlagh, 2018 Regulating Global Externalities


















2 − 2ρσ1σ2) + (σ22 − ρσ1σ2)β1
γ(σ21 + σ
2
2 − 2ρσ1σ2) + (σ21 − ρσ1σ2)β2
. (40)
This fundamental approach toward constructing Stabilized Trading allows for an equally
fundamental insight: Stabilized Trading and its optimal stabilization rate is not ‘just
another’ regulation rule that is optimized, it is the most efficient quantity-based regulation.
Several interesting properties of the optimal stabilization rate deserve elaboration. First,
as stated in the Proposition, hardly ever will this rate be unity. Thus, Stabilized Trading
outperforms traditional Trading in terms of welfare almost always. Second, the optimal
stabilization rate may well be negative, meaning that higher-than-expected smoking of
one smoker translates into higher-than-expected smoking by the other smoker too. Closer
inspection reveals such is more likely to occur for strongly positively correlated preferences
and very asymmetric uncertainty. This is easily understood: if we do not know the second
smoker too well but we do know he is very much alike the first smoker, then smoking should
be increased for both, or for none. A negative stabilization rate bears some resemblance
with putting negative weights on observations in making (econometric) predictions (see
Bunn, 1985; Elliott and Timmermann, 2004; Timmermann, 2006).
Third, the share of preference shifts absorbed by a smokers decreases in the smoker’s
responsiveness of benefits to smoking, that is, in its slope parameter β. For any adaption
of global smoke to shocks, marginal costs change accordingly. Since trade leads to the
ex-post equality of individual marginal benefits, and since an optimal mechanism equates
individual marginal benefits to global marginal costs, for any realized pair of shifts smoking
change relatively less for the smoker with steeper marginal benefits.
4.4 Asymmetric Uncertainty
Finally, our potentially most interesting observation is that the stabilization rate tends to
increase, all else equal, if the uncertainty of smoker 2 increases. This is clearly driven by
our choice of definition; had we alternatively set s1 + δs2 = 0, the result would be reversed.
The intuition remains unaffected, though, being that most variability is warranted for the
smoker who can be learned about most.
This intuition is most clearly understood by considering a rather extreme example.
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Suppose that smoker 1 is so frequent a visitor of this bar that the barkeeper in fact
has σ1 = 0, i.e. smoker 1’s preferences are perfectly predictable without error. Assume
moreover that this is not true for smoker 2, the new smoker in town, meaning σ2 > 0. The
barkeeper thus clearly faces a situation with asymmetric uncertainty about the smokers’
preferences.
Suppose now the barkeeper observes a reallocation of the initial distribution of cigarettes,
such that smoker 2 now smokes only four and smoker 1 a total of six. Since the barkeeper
knows the preferences of smoker 1 perfectly, and since trade will lead to equality of marginal
benefits, the barkeeper can thus infer the precise marginal benefits also of smoker 2. But
this, in turn, implies the barkeeper is able to identify the exact preferences of smoker 2,
including, that is, the initially unobserved shift θ2.
We learn something important here. Without paying attention to an asymmetry of
uncertainty, as in the classical argument made in favor of trade and markets, upon seeing
a flow of cigarettes from smoker 2 to smoker 1 all the barkeeper could conclude is that
preferences had shifted in such a way that the value of an extra cigarette was (much) higher
for smoker 1 than for smoker 2. The barkeeper may feel happy, for has not trade resulted
in an efficient exchange of cigarettes? True, these trades are efficient, but only at the
individual smoker’s level. The new allocation of cigarettes is constrained Pareto optimal,
i.e. given a potentially suboptimal aggregate consumption of cigarettes the individual
consumption levels are optimal. The barkeeper could have stopped there. However, we
argue it could have been know that the aggregate amount of smoking was in fact inefficient.
Taking into account the fact that smoker 1 has far less uncertain preferences than smoker
2, upon seeing a flow of cigarettes from the latter to the former, it can be concluded that
the ‘aggregate’ or ‘average’ preference for smoking is in fact lower than anticipated. After
all, a sale of cigarettes from smoker 2 to smoker 1 tells us more than simply that our initial
expectations about individual preferences were off – it tells us that smoker 2 has a weaker
preference for cigarettes than smoker 1, and since the latter’s preferences are known with
certainty, we can conclude what we may loosely write as θ2 < E[θ2]. The economist than
knows enough to conclude that the aggregate cap on smoking shall be tightened.
The lesson drawn from this extreme example is of course more generally true and
applicable: there is more scope for learning about agent whose preferences are more
uncertain. Etc.
Given an optimal stabilization rate, we can solve for the associated level of expected
global welfare. We do so in the our Theorem:
Theorem 1. Stabilized Trading is strictly welfare-superior to Quotas and Trading, with
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Proof. In Appendix. Q.E.D.
Since ∆TW > ∆STW , we refer to (12) and conclude that Stabilized Trading moves
prices closer to the Social Optimum than traditional Trading. We also see the illustration
used above reflected in our theorem. If the barkeeper has perfect information on one
smoker, σ1 = 0, then all preferences are revealed through trade and no welfare losses occur.
Moreover, it is straightforward to derive that price volatility relative to the ex ante price
level for both smokers is also lower under Stabilized Trading:




)2] ≤ E [(pT )2] . (42)
Proof. In appendix. Q.E.D.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
It has herein been demonstrated that fairly simple and straightforward manipulations of
traditional free trade in a market under regulation can yield substantial welfare gains. A
key concept used thereto is that of asymmetric uncertainty and the implied differential
learning potentials about different regulated agents. Our results can be directly applied to
all activities where a global externality creates market imperfections. One example would
be emission trading systems or regions, such as the different sectors or countries jointly
regulated in EU ETS or US states in RGGI.
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A Derivations and Proofs
DERIVATION OF (23):










PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
Proof. For the first part, note that Trading outperforms Quantities if and only if the









< (γ + β2)σ
2









γβ1 + γβ2 + β1β2
γβ1 + γβ2
,
which is always true. Q.E.D.
DERIVATION OF (30):




[δβ2 − γ(1− δ)]θ1 + [β1 + γ(1− δ)]θ2





[δβ2 − γ(1− δ)]θ1 + [β1 + γ(1− δ)]θ2





[δβ2 − γ(1− δ)]θ1 + [β1 + γ(1− δ)]θ2




β1 + γ(1− δ)
β1 + δβ2
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2 + β21β2 + β1β
2
2
(γβ1 + γβ2 + β1β2)2




(1− ξ)2σ21 + ξ2σ22 + 2ξ(1− ξ)ρσ1σ2
γβ1 + γβ2 + β1β2
. (49)





γβ1 + γβ2 + β1β2
, (50)





= 2ξσ22 − 2(1− ξ)σ21 + 2(1− ξ)ρσ1σ2 − 2ξρσ1σ2. (51)











2 − ρσ1σ2] + γ[σ21 − ρσ1σ2]
(β2 + γ)[σ21 − ρσ1σ2] + γ[σ22 − ρσ1σ2]
, (53)
as stated.
PROOF OF THEOREM 1:















































as stated. This is strictly lower than the welfare loss under traditional Trading if and only
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if:











γβ1 + γβ2 + β1β2
− β1 + β2













1 − β1σ22) + (β1 − β2)ρσ1σ2]2 ≥ 0,
which is always true. Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
Proof. We derived quantity derivations under both policies. Prices are equal in both















































)2] ⇐⇒ (δ − 1) [β2 (σ21 − ρσ1σ2)− β1 (σ22 − ρσ1σ2)] < 0.
We now invoke Proposition 2 and establish that this condition is always satisfied. Q.E.D.
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